

Book Reviews

KIVY, PETER. *Once-Told Tales: An Essay in Literary Aesthetics*. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, viii + 202 pp., \$104.95 cloth.

“Unpopular theses in philosophy are by their nature seldom accepted. But, on the other hand, they seldom go *unnoticed*: and, as someone famous once said, to be noticed is all, just as long as your name is spelled correctly” (p. 164). Thus ends the main body of Peter Kivy’s new book, *Once-Told Tales: An Essay in Literary Aesthetics*. I suspect the theses of this book will be unpopular. So let us take notice.

The main claims in the book, Kivy tells us in a kind of late-occurring summary, are “five interrelated theses about the novel and silent novel-reading” (p. 163). They are: first, that the novel is a far less “aesthetic” art than is usually thought; second, that the majority of serious novel readers are, more or less, in-it-for-the-story readers; third, that, as a consequence, the novel is not usually a repeated artwork; fourth, that the narrative structure of the novel is not usually an object of the novel reader’s aesthetic appreciation; and, finally, that the novel, although it can, as part of its proper function, arouse the garden-variety emotions through what I have called the unwilling suspension of disbelief, is in the emotion-arousing business far less than is usually made out, as compared with the stage play and film. Each of these claims requires a lot of explanation. In this book, the explanations are intricately interwoven. This fact precludes any quick summary of the argument we might be tempted to offer. Another reason a quick summary is difficult is that Kivy has assembled a set of reflections that weaves a defense of these claims only after the fact, so to speak. I finally came to call this feature of his book a “disparity of reasons” approach. For each discussion by itself is interesting on its own terms and only later does the implication for a single coherent viewpoint sink in.

Kivy himself remarks, worriedly I think, on this disparity of reasons feature on several occasions. He is probably right to do so. I actually think, however,

that he need not have worried. Perhaps there could have been a more straightforward defense of the central claims. Much of the pleasure of reading this book would have been diminished, at least on any way I have imagined the construction of that argument. For a good deal of the pleasure in reading this book is watching Kivy hit upon and then work through the problems he sets for himself, as they come up in the course of the argument. Accordingly, here is only a sketch of some of the supports Kivy offers for the central claims of the book.

One of those supports is found in the first chapter, where Kivy employs a kind of “hook,” namely, that of merely explaining the title of the book. The reality is that he is committed to the truth of a number of empirical claims, the first of which is that most people who read novels read them only once. This goes even for good novels and even for “serious” readers of novels. The truth of this claim has implications for what is to count as literature; but it need not have the implication that just anything goes. For it only implies that “the first and only reading [of a novel with superior qualities] will provide greater readerly satisfaction than the first and only reading of a run-of-the-mill whodunit, at least to the reader qualified to appreciate its superior qualities” (p. 7).

A second support is found in Chapter 2, where again a “hook” is employed, this time to explain the subtitle of the book. The actual goal is to accept and extend a common distinction between aesthetic properties and those that are art-relevant, that is, between the aesthetics of a work and its artistry. Kivy does not present an analysis of the distinction. But he does note that, as he will draw it, “aesthetic” will be taken narrowly, while “art-relevant” will be taken broadly. And acknowledging the distinction in this way allows him to make one of the genuinely striking claims in the book, namely, that the aesthetics of literature is “a neglected topic,” and that this is because most of the philosophical attention to novelistic works of literature has been directed at those features of novels that are generated by their contents or our reactions

to those contents and not to their form or structure. Only the latter, he maintains, is the bearer of aesthetic features.

This perhaps startling claim is given support by the argument in the third chapter, where Kivy discusses perceptual and structural properties, in contrast to so-called "other aesthetic properties" that are, in the main, about the contents of novels and are art-relevant properties but not aesthetic properties at all. This observation, in turn, is supported by the first of several contrasts in the book between the experience of reading and the experience of listening to "absolute music."

The claim is given further support by drawing a distinction among five kinds of readers (pp. 33–34). There is of course the "non-serious reader," and we can ignore that one altogether. But, Kivy holds, there are four kinds of "serious readers." The first of these is the reader who is in it for the story. She contrasts with the nonserious reader in that they read different things and the practice of reading has a different importance to them. The serious but in-it-for-the-story reader is different in her own way from the "serious thoughtful reader" who is attracted to the great novels in the canon because these attempt to say something to us about our lives. She, in turn, is distinguishable from the "serious structural reader," who, like the first two, is in it for the story but also "will perceive and enjoy the various aspects of structure that can rightly be described as *aesthetic* features" (p. 34, italics in the original). And, finally, we come to the "serious studious reader," who studies a novel, perhaps in order to teach it or perhaps, as Kivy suspects, to improve her own writing. This distinction among kinds of readers is fairly natural and probably comports well with most readers' actual experience. But I trust that its implications for the main claims of the book, still unpopular mind you, will cause some readers of Kivy's book to consider it a flawed taxonomy. I do not.

At several points in the book, Kivy makes use of the empirical truth that most novels are, unlike most musical performances, not attended to in one sitting. The "gaps," as he calls them, call attention to the fact that we often treat novels, and usually do not treat pieces of music, as interruptible. Such interruptions are, Kivy suggests, useful to us in novel reading because they give us pause to reflect on a novel's *contents*. It is in connection with thinking about the contents of novels that Kivy teases out, over a number of chapters, the supports he offers for the fifth claim, namely, that "the novel . . . is in the emotion-arousing business far less than is usually made out" (p. 155).

One of the real pleasures of reading this book has to do with those arguments, some of which are surely familiar to readers of Kivy's earlier work. A

case in point is his argument (in Chapter 4) against aesthetic autonomism and, in that connection, his discussion of Plato, Berys Gaut, and Colin McGinn. The discussion of the "gaps" themselves (in Chapter 6) and why and how they are useful to the novel reader, as well as why and how they are not useful to the serious listener to music, is another case in point. That discussion also underlines the disparity of reasons mentioned above. For Kivy announces the discussion in Chapter 6 by remarking that he has just been curious, although for a very long time, about the fact that we are not disturbed by interruptions in reading even short novels, but would be disturbed were we to be interrupted in listening to a piece of music, of whatever length. The role of his solution to that curiosity in supporting the main claims listed above is almost out of sight until it suddenly pops into view.

However, the most direct argument in favor of Kivy's fifth claim, that "the novel . . . is in the emotion-arousing business far less than is usually made out" (p. 155), is made in Chapters 7 and 8, where Kivy takes up the familiar problem of our emotional reactions to fictional characters. Unlike most solutions to this problem, Kivy's, which is novel and well worth the read for its own sake, leads to the question of whether our reactions are the same across modes of delivery for fictional objects. That is, Kivy's way of dealing with this problem raises this question: do our reactions to the plight of a character in a novel have the same intensity that our reactions to that same plight for the same character would have in a movie or a play? I think that the fact that his theory raises this question at all is a mark in favor of worrying about the problem in his way, whatever you or I might think about his solution.

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LEHRER, KEITH. *Art, Self, and Knowledge*. Oxford University Press, 2012, xii + 212 pp., \$99.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

"This book concerns the role of art in human experience" (p. 3). As one makes one's way through Keith Lehrer's sprawling *Art, Self, and Knowledge*, one will begin to think these opening words an understatement, for Lehrer attempts to show how art transforms audience members in deep and profound ways, in a number of different contexts. In one sense Lehrer is an outsider, having spent most of his distinguished career working in epistemology, only recently becoming interested in writing on aesthetics. In another sense, however, he is an insider, since in

this book he is dealing specifically with the *epistemology* of art (and in some parts just epistemology) and he has also been a working painter for many years. A cursory glance at the bibliography may give some readers concern about his familiarity with the contemporary literature, but we have to remember that being entrenched in a debate is not always a virtue; sometimes a new eye can see what the practiced eye cannot.

The structure of the book is as follows: In the first two chapters, Lehrer provides an account of a kind of representation found in art he calls *exemplarization*, defined as “using an exemplar to represent a class of objects” (p. 10). What makes this kind of representation distinctive, he claims, is that the represented class of objects includes the exemplar itself; thus, an exemplar represents itself as well as the other objects in the class. In the next six chapters, Lehrer applies his account of exemplarization to a number of issues and problems: the value of feminist art (Chapter 3); value found in art in general, expression of emotion in art, globalization (Chapter 4); artistic creation, the notion of self, freedom (Chapter 5); death, the relation of death and beauty (Chapter 6); intentionality, the nature of qualia (Chapter 7); and the definition of “art” (Chapter 8). In the last three chapters, he constructs an epistemological account he calls “loop theory” that is intended to show how content experienced in art can be transferred to the world outside the artwork and to explain “the role of art in telling the story of the self and the world, self in the world, and world in the self” (p. 173).

Some readers may be thrown by the rhetorical strategy of the book, as it begins with exemplarization, which is supposed to be the answer to a question that becomes explicit only in the chapters that follow. Chapter 1 begins with the following: “My general thesis about art is that art reconfigures or transforms experience by creating content. Art is that part of the world that changes the content of the world. Of course, art is part of the world whose content is changed by art. So art changes the content of art” (p. 9). It is only in the later chapters that it becomes clear that his account of exemplarization is an attempt to show how *visual* art, and even *abstract* visual art, can so reconfigure and transform experience.

There are several ways that we might understand this notion of reconfiguring experience. First, it might mean that visual art can change how someone perceives the object, or similar objects, depicted in the painting. Thus, viewing a portrait of a person might change the way viewers perceive the depicted person; similarly, viewing a still life of an apple might change how viewers perceive apples in general. Second, experience might be reconfigured when viewing a painting of a depicted object or (in the case of abstract art) patches of color, shapes, and tex-

tures and results in viewers being able more fully to understand not concrete objects depicted in the art (if there are any), but abstract elements in the world. Third, viewers may undergo a transformation in experience in general as a result of aesthetic experience, seeing the world and everything in it in a different way. Obviously, the third interpretation of reconfigured experience is the most philosophically interesting and, if this kind of reconfiguration ever occurs, it would constitute the undeniable cognitive value of art. Things become less interesting with the second interpretation and less interesting still on the first. So which one does Lehrer intend? All of them. He discusses the example of a portrait of Madame Pompadour to show how we can transfer content of the painting to the world outside the painting, suggesting that the important question is whether it represents her as “what she was really like.” He refers to abstract paintings representing such abstractions as “feeling,” “the void,” “nothingness,” “color in the void,” “emotion and feeling in color,” and even “contentlessness,” and further suggests that viewers generalize from these experiences to others. Finally, in the last chapter of the book, he says, “Exemplar representation of novel form and content in aesthetic appreciation and attention offers us a new conception of our world and ourselves” (p. 174). If he is correct that his account of exemplarization shows how each of these kinds of reconfigurations of experience is possible, the book would be a significant contribution to the field. Since most readers will be most interested in Lehrer’s account of exemplarization and since everything rides on its plausibility, I will spend the rest of this review focusing on the first two chapters of the book and raise a worry about the account.

The notion of exemplar representation, or exemplarization, is construed in terms of experience. The experience of viewing an artwork as exemplar represents a class of experiences of which it is a member and is thus also part of the represented. But in order for the artwork to serve as exemplar, some generalization from the one experience to others must be possible. Lehrer uses Frank Jackson’s example of Mary the scientist, discussed in philosophy of mind, as one in which an experience can serve as an exemplar of other experiences: in this case, the experience of seeing red. Mary is a scientist who knows every physical fact about color, but has never experienced color, until one day she sees a ripe tomato. Most people have the intuition that Mary will learn something new about the color red: namely, *that is* what it is like to see red (with the *that* indexically referring to her experience when she sees the tomato). Lehrer argues that the experience of seeing red for Mary is an instance of exemplarization, since it “gives the particular a functional role, the role of a primitive

sign, using it to identify what we would call *red* experiences” (p. 16, emphasis in original).

But there is something amiss about his use of the Mary example. Consider another example Lehrer uses, his painting of the House of Seven Gables, *Two Chimneys*. He claims that as a result of experiencing the painting, the viewer “has a new way of identifying particulars, particular experiences of the painting and the house, and so gains knowledge of how to identify them” (p. 19). It goes without saying that, for me to have gained “knowledge of how to identify [the house],” the painting would have to bear some relevant resemblance to the house. Otherwise, the experience of seeing the depicted house could not serve as an exemplar for the experience of seeing the actual house, which is what Lehrer is trying to establish. The gap between the experience of the painting and the experience of the house, in this case, would prevent the generalization from seeing the painting to the class of experiences that would include seeing the house, thus preventing the experience of the painting serving as exemplar for this class. It could be an exemplar for the class of experiences of seeing *this painting*, but that would be trivial and surely not enough for there to be cognitive value.

So a natural question to ask is: what grounds the generalization from the singular experience of viewing *Two Chimneys* to the experiences of seeing the House of Seven Gables? Exemplar representation, which Lehrer calls *full exemplarization*, “functions like a predicate,” he says, “in that [an exemplar] may be affirmed of objects it applies to,” but it is “unlike a linguistic predicate” because “it has the function of representing objects by showing us what they are like by exhibiting what they are like by exhibiting what it itself is like” (pp. 16–17). But then it must be clear *how* the exemplar represents these objects: that is, in what respect the exemplar is like what the experiences in the class are like. In the Mary example it is clear, because the redness of the tomato *jumps out* at Mary; it is at the center of her visual attentional field. But then the what-it-is-like of seeing red is the element unifying the class of experiences represented by Mary’s seeing the tomato. When a viewer sees *Two Chimneys*, it is not clear that she will find an element in the painting that jumps out such that the experience serves as an exemplar for experiencing the House of Seven Gables. Even the seven gables may not be sufficient to lead the viewer to the conclusion that it is *the* famous house written about by Hawthorne that is being depicted. Therefore, while Mary’s seeing red may be a case of exemplarization, it is not clear that viewing paintings represent in the same way. And this, of course, is the weakest sense of reconfiguring experience that I highlighted above. It is more difficult still to see

what grounds generalizations from particular experiences of artworks to experiences of abstractions or to experiences of the world and our selves within the world.

There are various ways that one could explain how an exemplar represents a class of objects of which it is a member, but each of them is forestalled by Lehrer. First, a class of experiences could be unified by a single property or predicate possessed by the exemplar. He rejects this possibility because it would be equivalent to Goodman’s *exemplification*, which is a species of *linguistic* representation, where the exemplar would refer to a predicate that would then represent the class. Second, a cluster of properties might determine the class, such that there could be similarity relations between the experiences of the class. He rejects similarity as a basis for generalization, since everything is similar to everything else in some respect, and because similarity presupposes generalization, rather than the other way round. Third, a viewer may be able to make an inference of some sort from the experience of the artwork to other experiences, thus making the original experience an exemplar. The representation Lehrer describes, however, is direct and noninferential. The exemplar, he writes, “has a functional role in picking out the tokens in the extension represented by exhibiting what they are like” (p. 39). The picking out is direct and happens by virtue of my having the experience. “The exemplar stands for a class of states including itself without being inferred from other states” (p. 41). Lehrer does spend some time trying to explain how it is possible for content found in artworks to be extended beyond them to the world outside of the work, and this leads to his account of loop theory. The worry I have, however, is not about the extending of content beyond the work, but knowing exactly *where to extend it to*. How can the experience represent a class of experiences if the viewer is not sure which class of experiences it is exemplarizing?

In the end, this book never makes altogether clear what class is being exemplarized by the exemplar. It is possible that avid readers of Lehrer’s earlier work in epistemology will have a better fix on this issue than the rest of us. And indeed, Lehrer seems to assume that readers know his epistemological work well enough to preclude the need for clarification on this point (by my count there are fifty-seven references to his earlier work in 195 pages of text). But, the main argument of the book does not stand on its own, and many readers, particularly those who are drawn to it by the prospect of fresh insights about art, will be disappointed by its lack of clarity on central points. There are rich and intriguing insights here, along with a robust and commendable attempt to address a number of perennial philosophical problems. What is missing, however, is that coherent,

convincing account we were promised of how visual art transforms audience members in deep and profound ways.

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STROUD, SCOTT R. *John Dewey and the Artful Life: Pragmatism, Aesthetics, and Morality*. Penn State University Press, 2011, x + 229 pp., \$69.95 cloth.

With *John Dewey and the Artful Life*, Scott Stroud has made a substantial contribution to Deweyan aesthetics, not only by way of interpreting Dewey to his readers (and here he draws from a wide range of Dewey's writings in addition to *Art as Experience*), but also through developing a Deweyan approach to art and aesthetics generally. His concern is to explore the concept of aesthetic experience, and he begins this with the question of how to integrate art into daily life and how to make an artful life possible. This leads him to explore the relation between aesthetic and moral experience, arguing that art can be seen as a method of moral cultivation. He recognizes that this direction may lead to a worry that art would lose its intrinsic value. His response is to question the usefulness of the very distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value (a distinction that is promoted, for example, by Malcolm Budd). While affirming the immediate and unique value provided by art, Stroud insists on connections with other values in the wider cultural context. Value, he insists, is not beyond historical conditions. Samuel Taylor Coleridge's poetry, for example, is valuable given its context of production and reception. Nor, for this reason, can one maintain a strict distinction between what is internal and what is external to a work of art. Stroud finds this commonly stressed distinction troubling in that it posits aesthetic experience and its value as different in kind from other sorts of experience, and it shortchanges the cognitive value of art.

Following the pragmatist emphasis on improving experience, and drawing from the idea of the aesthetic attitude (while modifying it), Stroud sees aesthetic experience as a matter of taking the right orientation toward the aesthetic object. This means attending to the concrete situation in all its richness. He distinguishes himself from such traditional defenders of aesthetic distance and attitude as Edward Bullough and Jerome Stolnitz, who saw aesthetic experience as disconnected from the practical. Whereas they thought aesthetic experience must be disinterested, Stroud thinks it is sometimes appropriate to

take an interested stance, as in political art. At the same time, he maintains that subjective orientation is important for aesthetic experience, rejecting George Dickie's and Noël Carroll's deflation of aesthetic experience to "mere" attention, that is, to aesthetic and design properties internal to the art object. Rather, he affirms that there are different ways to attend to the same object and that one improves experience by way of change of attitude.

Stroud draws from Asian traditions as well as the philosophy of Dewey in stressing the idea of moral cultivation. In Dewey, this is found in the notion of meliorism: the possibility of developmental progress. Stroud believes that aesthetic experience requires attention to something in its immediacy. In art, one should focus not so much on art objects as on art experience and on shaping our habits with regard to art through conscious effort and intelligent direction. This requirement can also be extended to life in general. We should try to make our lives more unified, alive, and absorptive through attending to the situation in hand. In doing so, we make our experiences more aesthetic and artful. Art objects are valuable because they exemplify what all action should aim for, that is, seeing present means as valuable and intrinsically (not merely mechanically or causally) connected to ends. In particular, we should not take present activity as a mere means to a remote end. In line with this, rather than trying to define art in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, Stroud seeks a reconstructive definition, one that will be conducive to moral and experiential progress. A reconstructive definition, unlike a classificatory one, is value-oriented and directed to future practice.

The experience of art objects is morally cultivating because it instantiates the end of moral cultivation: attention to the concrete situation in its immediacy. Art has a power to spur reflection by way of its meaningful properties. Following Joseph Margolis, Stroud holds that these properties are determinable but not determinate. That is, there is a range of acceptable meanings in art. Rather than focusing on the intended meaning of the artist, Stroud stresses what art is intended to do: that is, it is used by the artist to evoke reflective and deliberative experience in the observer. We are thus brought to experience the art object *as if* someone intended to bring about a certain experience, even when that is not clearly the case. In doing so, art has a communicative and often even an argumentative function: it causes us to reconsider values. It follows that art is not just expressive of an artist's meaning but also incorporates the audience's reception.

Although Dewey's focus was mainly on the traditional arts, Stroud also applies his thinking to everyday life. (His thinking here is very much inspired

by Richard Shusterman.) Any activity can be made more aesthetic, more artful. For example, there are artful possibilities in everyday (that is, nonart) communication, as in conversation between friends. One can make communication more artful by attending to, and valuing, means and ends as integrally connected, that is, as seeing the activity as a medium and not as a mere means. By contrast, if one's way of attending to the communication of others is mechanical and externally goal-driven, then aesthetic experience will not happen. This approach leads to the possibility of experiencing even simple communication with a store clerk as a unified whole that can be enjoyed as having its own meaning, and therefore as being aesthetic. Stroud holds, further, that communication can be immediately valuable as involving harmonious coordination with others. He further endorses the Deweyan theory of democracy as a life in which communication is free and enriching. For Stroud, as well as for Dewey, full actualization of the potentialities of communication is the same as full actualization of the potentialities of democracy.

The tricky part of Stroud's enterprise is to bridge the gap often found between the aesthetic and the moral. He believes this can be done by way of Dewey's location of the moral value of aesthetic experience in the experience itself. This leads to what Stroud calls "orientational meliorism," the project of improving one's experience by shifting one's attitude toward oneself and others. One can, for example, transform work that appears to be mere drudgery (hence nonaesthetic) to something more meaningful through paying close attention to the situation at hand. Under these conditions the distinction between work and play is loosened, and continuities between them are stressed. The ideal orientation according to Dewey, and accepted by Stroud, combines the attitudes of work and play. Here, again, Stroud also borrows from traditions other than pragmatism. For example, he draws from Buddhism the idea that in improving communication one should not attend too much to the idea of a separate or transcendent self. He also gains inspiration from Brother Lawrence of the Resurrection (1614–1691), who sought religious meaning in everyday work and activity (for example, cooking and sandal making), seeing each task as part of a conversation with God.

What then is the artful life? It is one that attends to the demands of the situation in a progressive way. These demands include the needs of the subject as well as demands of other individuals and the environment. The artful life is living life in the present through developing habits with the view to improving the quality of experience, for example, in intensified experience of such things as the delightful coolness of water on a hot summer day or a powerful work of art.

I find particularly useful Stroud's expansion of everyday aesthetics to include not only such things as ordinary conversation, but also moral cultivation. There are certainly many similarities between aesthetics and ethics upon which he can build. Yet, even though aesthetic and moral experiences can both be unified, consummatory, and absorptive, they can also be radically different. For example, there seems to be nothing aesthetic about getting angry at a false accusation. There is no element of fine discrimination, heightened pleasure, or artfulness here. This anger is simply a spontaneous moral feeling. Granted, treating someone as an end and not as a means often requires imagination, and imagination is also important for the arts. Yet, an immoral person can still be highly aesthetically sensitive. Although aesthetic experience can contribute to moral cultivation, if we are focusing on how to make our lives more artful or aesthetic, we might well be neglecting how to make them more moral.

It could also be argued that Stroud is too optimistic in his conviction that we can change the quality of our experience simply through a change of attitude. He speaks of hospital orderlies who are happy in their jobs because they focus on the positive aspects of their interpersonal relations. This certainly happens. Yet, this approach will look naïve to someone concerned about exploitation in the workplace. Is subjective orientation the key to melioration or is organized resistance perhaps more important in the long run? Although conceding that objective conditions may be more or less conducive to higher-level experience and that attending to a negative situation involves trying to improve it, Stroud insists that focusing on negative social conditions lacks the easy implementation that individual orientation provides, since changing the material setup would require revolutionary change and probably coercion. Yet, surely there are many less global actions than revolution that could improve oppressive conditions without unjust coercion, for example, a union struggle for fair wages.

Stroud also considers the objection that a Nazi doctor who experiments on Jewish prisoners might be cultivated in music, but not in moral matters. According to the objector, aesthetic experience is not then an instance of moral cultivation. Stroud replies that the Nazi is not a truly cultivated person because he is not "attending to vital parts of the situation in front of him" (p. 202), that is, when in a theater listening to a concert. But what exactly *is* the situation in front of him? Does it include the lives of concentration camp victims back at the camp? How is the Nazi not attending to "the situation" if he is at a concert and fully attending to the performance? There are other ways to describe this problem that do not mix aesthetic and ethical matters in this way. For

example, we could say that the Nazi should not even *be* at the concert, since his moral duty (although he does not recognize it) is to free the prisoners. Perhaps choosing what we attend to (opera or the situation of the prisoners) is itself a moral matter, and here moral values just are more important than aesthetic values.

Still, Stroud's book is admirable in stressing the importance of subjective melioration within one's own life. Indeed, reading this book has led me to try to change some of my own habits: to be more present-oriented, for example. In sum, this is an exceptionally impressive book. It not only adds to contemporary reinterpretations of Dewey's thought in aesthetics and ethics but also raises serious issues concerning fundamental assumptions predominant in contemporary aesthetics. Moreover, it provides new material in the growing field of everyday aesthetics, especially in the area of communication and in the role that everyday aesthetics plays in the good life. Anyone interested in aesthetics or ethics, and particularly in the relation between the two, will benefit from reading it.

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KRAMER, LAWRENCE. *Interpreting Music*. University of California Press, 2011, viii + 322 pp., \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Interpreting Music is an ambitious book. Using music from Chopin to Schnittke, it discusses various concepts and practices related to musical interpretation, which Kramer conceives "as address, as understanding, and as performance" (p. 279). Each chapter addresses the four questions posed at the outset: "What do we do when we interpret music? What do we learn by doing it? What is at stake? Why should we care?" (p. 1).

The range of subjects is given in the chapter titles: hermeneutics, language, subjectivity, meaning, metaphor, history, influence, deconstruction, analysis, resemblance, things, classical, modern, works, performance, and musicology. There is a trajectory from methodological basics through historical and cultural issues to matters of discipline. To an extent, this recalls the comprehensive ambitions of treatises like Roger Scruton's *The Aesthetics of Music* (Oxford University Press, 1997), though *Interpreting Music* is grounded in a different attitude toward totality, in terms of its basic aesthetic values and methodology: put simplistically, there is an intentionally looser framing of the relationship between subjectivity and music. The chapter that shows the distance from Scruton

most clearly is "Things," which is an important one for Kramer. Even though it is not explicitly used in other chapters, insights from Thing Theory inform Kramer's general approach at a deep level, and its influence is aesthetic and ideological. His summary is helpful: "Objects are fixed, inanimate, distanced forms that are what they are; they're 'objective.' Things are open-ended, semianimate, intimate forms that become what they are as we become what we are. Their consistency is neither objective nor subjective but an unstable blend of both. Unlike objects, things have lives of their own. Objects exemplify categories; things acquire histories" (p. 186).

Throughout the book, Kramer is careful to treat music not as an object, but as a thing. This means "detaching the work from the ideas of totality and finality" (p. 256) and acknowledging that the hermeneutic circle around which musical things drift is actually a hermeneutic spiral. He would probably agree with M. M. Bakhtin's view: "The task consists in forcing the *thinglike* environment, which mechanically influences the personality, to begin to speak, that is, to reveal in it the potential word and tone, to transform it into a semantic context for the thinking, speaking and acting (as well as creating) personality" (M. M. Bakhtin, "Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences," in his *Speech Genres and Other Essays*, trans. Vern McGee [University of Texas Press, 1986], pp. 159–172, at p. 164). Kramer's neat discussion of things recalls Peter Szendy's *Listen: A History of Our Ears* (trans. Charlotte Mandell [Fordham University Press, 2008]), in which "plastic listening" is theorized as in part the fate of the work in the era of mechanical reproduction, and Szendy and he share two essential characteristics: looseness and a willingness to embrace "ontological openness" (pp. 187, 189). This should be applauded, for not every scholar can step back enough and let the working of the writing work on the reader; most do not trust each other enough to give it a try and to open themselves up to potential "partage" (Jean-Luc Nancy, quoted pp. 38, 41–42), despite the fact that, as Kramer notes at strategic points, trust is central to the process by which subjectivity is attributed to statements about music (for example, pp. 46, 51, 188).

"So what is musicology good for?" (p. 278), Kramer asks in the final chapter, returning to the third and fourth opening questions. If musicology is both to be good for something and to have an impact on the everyday consumption of music, as Kramer desires, having asserted that "there is little real difference between expert 'structural listening' and anyone's unreflective absorption in a good tune or infectious 'beat'" (p. 56), then that impact has to be agreed upon and shared by the community, like music itself. Unlike the music itself, though, which, notwithstanding its fundamental iterability, is free to

withdraw into oblivion once it has sounded, musicology's impact on its community has, in addition, to be repeatable on a pragmatic and quotidian level. This requirement is necessary in order that it is a sustainable academic discourse; it must be teachable.

This repeatability comes from musicological discourse slowing down, pausing for effects to happen. Luckily, "[l]anguage has a tendency to slow this process; [while] music accelerates it" (p. 95). Kramer used to say that on the back of this slowing down, the musical text "must be made to yield to understanding" (*Music as Cultural Practice 1800–1900* [University of California Press, 1990], p. 6), but it is worth pausing to note that "yield" in at least the agricultural sense means waiting until the time is right and the crop is ripe. High-octave virtuosity is unhelpful in this respect: here today, gone tomorrow. Thus, the pundits on the back cover of *Interpreting Music* have misattributed its value. They rightly praise Kramer for his "virtuosic wordplay," for ensuring that the text is "laced with wit," and for his "astonishing performance . . . virtuosic, exhilarating, and provocative." However, what they should first praise him for (or, equally, take issue with) is his patience, slowness, absorption, wonder, and care over details.

For there is much more to learn from the manner in which Kramer pores over the little issues and details that are "hermeneutic windows": moments that "must usually stand out to absorb and release hermeneutic energy, to gather and dispense meaning" (p. 189). These "minute particulars" (p. 81) drive the process of "learn[ing] to concretize the illocutionary forces of music" (*Music as Cultural Practice*, p. 9). They include the diminished chords in *La Malinconia* from Beethoven's String Quartet Op. 18 no. 6 (pp. 133–143), the "peaks and valleys [in Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata and Chopin's Fantaisie-Impromptu, which are] the points of endowment from which meaning extends to 'cover' the work as a whole" (p. 182), and the quirky history and historiography of "influence" (pp. 113–127). The little issues are more often than not oddities of all shapes, sizes, and sounds: sensuous particulars in respect to which "truth itself depends on the tempo, the patience and perseverance of lingering with the particulars" (Adorno, quoted p. 18). Such musical particulars draw attention to the contingency of scholarly engagement: that it could always be different.

And here lies the moral of Kramer's tale: it could always be different, "rendered otherwise" (p. 271) as he describes a performance of Chopin's Mazurka Op. 33 no. 4. What could be different is not just musicology (this is no longer an insight). What could always be different is music itself: indeed, not just the music itself, but the "itself" of music. As Kramer writes in his chapter on subjectivity, "The subject is a disposition to incessant and multiple relationships" (p. 49).

His employment of Thing Theory has the effect of unsettling musical ontology, not just provocatively, as one regularly expects from him, but productively. As a thing, music is loosened from its metaphysical jetty and launched into an "irrepressibly volatile and abundant" sea of activity (*Music as Cultural Practice*, p. 2): "Once started, metaphor never stops" (p. 91). Kramer has always been concerned to remind us that meaning does not wait around within music for listeners to decode at their leisure; it emerges every time music is actively listened to, and thus no interpretation ever completely or firmly stabilizes it. He used to claim that music's "meanings are definite enough to support critical interpretations" (*Music as Cultural Practice*, p. 1), but he has gradually loosened up the sense of "definite" and moved from meanings "supporting" interpretations to meanings "affording" interpretations. He now maintains that whereas musical objects support interpretations, musical things afford them, and this takes music's fluidity and looseness to a more productive ontological level. The "radically ascriptive nature of all interpretation" (*Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History* [University of California Press, 2002], p. 170) has deepened from an essential truth to a show of faith, and subjectivity has become a matter of "style and rhythm" (p. 5). Thus, he writes on the closing page of *Interpreting Music* that meaning "comes about neither in the music nor in its performance nor in the responses to them nor in the verbal accounting of them. It comes about in the event that brings these things together" (p. 290). Bakhtin would agree: "A meeting with a great human being, as something that determines, obligates, and unites—this is the highest moment of understanding" (M. M. Bakhtin, "From Notes Made in 1970–71," in his *Speech Genres* [University of Texas Press, 1986], pp. 132–158, at p. 142). Kramer is undertaking an important task, both individually and for musicology in general: staging the meeting, reconciliation, and rebonding of what Jerrold Levinson spread apart as "critical interpretation" and "performative interpretation" (Jerrold Levinson, "Performative versus Critical Interpretation in Music," reprinted in his *The Pleasure of Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays* [Cornell University Press, 1996], pp. 60–89).

Is it in theorizing this event of meeting that Kramer bequeaths a pedagogical method to musicology? No. Despite the wide range of subjects covered, despite the imaginative definition of hermeneutics (which he presents as an annotated list of eleven activities that it is not [pp. 7–11]), despite describing his approach as "nonreductionist contextualism," and despite the general point above about the need for musicology to be teachable, there is no simple method in his magic. To be fair, he does not try to present one, certainly not didactically, and it would be tricky to extrapolate a method from *Interpreting Music* and present it to

rookie musicologists as an educational primer. The best bet would probably be a long list of examples of good practice extracted from the book and a covering note in the manner of the later Wittgenstein, saying something like: "Do it like this; don't philosophise, just describe." Even without all the Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek (who, for my money, still tend to function like heavies outside the nightclub), what Kramer espouses is more of an attitude of mind and a state of consciousness than a method. His bequest is more useful than a method to *teach*: it is a way of *learning*. If anything, his practice is therapeutic and mildly confessional, and the many episodes of highly articulate, self-reflective, and imaginative responses to music trace out a stream of private (or at least interior) experiences that have been opened up, mediated, and shared for others to reflect on. In other words, like Kramer's previous books, *Interpreting Music* is both a rigorous contribution to scholarship and a flamboyant exercise in consciousness raising, showing in copious detail how music's contexts, and thus its meanings, have always been hidden in plain view.

Where once New Musicology, and within it Kramer's brand of hermeneutics, could with a certain justification present itself as the redeemer of a broadly positivistic and formalist musicology, now Critical Musicology (Kramer's preferred disciplinary umbrella) is itself in need of an eschatology, lest it become nothing more than a Sunday pastime for the chattering classes. Kramer goes a long way toward providing this in *Interpreting Music*, culminating in the final chapter, but further proselytizing is needed. Kramer is certainly correct that "[t]he times make it difficult to distinguish between responsible inquiry and self-mystification, between a historical hermeneutics of art and aesthetic escapism" (p. 279), and his own interpretive practice works hard to be more than cleverness and wordplay. But one could argue that, as part of a broader energetics of music, hermeneutics needs to acknowledge more of its libidinal roots, especially since, in line with numerous others in recent years, Kramer has made a big thing of music being a cultural trope for the self, and never more so than in this latest book, as when in numerous places he claims that "the peculiar power of music is, if we will let it, to dramatise the interpretive process" (p. 86). As Kramer conceives it, interpretation is Janus-faced, being on the one hand an issue of penetration and on the other hand a problem of protection. On the one hand, it is the manifestation of a drive to penetrate the music, an insistence that it can be penetrated, a belief that there is an interiority to the music that can be interpreted, and a claim that it is worth interpreting, even as the libidinal drive behind interpretation itself turns the music into a Möbius strip without distinction between in-

side and out. On the other hand, and particularly under post-Enlightenment Modernist regimes, interpretation is the decisive protector of music's meaning and inner significance, its timely good Samaritan. It is the prophet of music's advent into a greater ontological plenitude and its continuing mission in the Western developed world.

Much has happened since Michael Krausz edited *The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Culture now clamors for attention, criteria of correctness have been supplemented by evidence for credibility, interpretation ends up back in the world, and so on. All this has been positive insofar as it has afforded the development of the interpreter's voice and directed attention to the meanings of subjectivity in the contemporary world. For hermeneutically minded scholars like Kramer in particular, it has been axiomatic that "[m]usic shows us that meaning is what performance performs. Music shows us that performance is how meaning means" (p. 272). On a broader level, it has long been important in the developed world that "to find oneself entertained is to entertain a self, as one entertains a thought or, even better, a guest" (*Musical Meaning*, p. 9). This is also a keystone of the quintessential Kramerian text: *Let Me Entertain You*. *Interpreting Music* does this handsomely and with panache.

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OLSEN, STEIN HAUGOM and ANDERS PETTERSSON, eds.
Why Literary Studies? Raisons D'être of a Discipline. Oslo: Novus Press, 2011, 219 pp., NOK 245.00 paper.

The title of this collection asks a question that literary scholars may fear is raised all too often nowadays in the offices of deans and college presidents. In *Why Literary Studies? Raisons D'être of a Discipline*, Stein Haugom Olsen and Anders Pettersson gather essays from six figures. Most are Scandinavian; all were trained in literary studies and work now in the interstices between literature and contemporary philosophy. And part of their mission is to calm the fears: the fears that literary criticism is little more than an assortment of randomly impressionistic *aperçus*, ever more marginal in the face of technological and scientific advances. "The collection," the editors note in the introduction, "is not occasioned or permeated by a sense of crisis" (p. 11), but rather from a sense of "optimism on behalf of literary studies" (p. 27). Literary studies, suggest the contributors, has a history that is as progressive and respectable as that

of chemistry or geology: “literary works are better appreciated today than at any time before in the history of literature” (p. 93), and “years of careful textual scholarship, critical and interpretive conjecture, and informative contextualization” have resulted “in a vast accumulation of excellent literary knowledge” (p. 107).

In part, this optimism arises from the confidence among these papers about literature itself; each author gives good reasons for thinking literary works should be cherished and preserved. The ultimate goal of the volume, however, is less a defense of literature than a defense of literary studies; the book is not an apology for poets, but an apology for those of us teaching and writing about the poets. The essays offer this defense from within what the editors call “the same general paradigm,” its authors sharing “an interest in literary aesthetics informed . . . by mainstream Anglophone philosophy” (p. 11), with a particular indebtedness to “analytic aesthetics and philosophy of mind” (p. 27). This debt alone makes the book commendably unorthodox. With local exceptions (Reed Way Dasenbrock’s promotion of Donald Davidson, for instance) literary studies has long kept its distance from the core areas of Anglo-American philosophy. The essays are also commendable for the way they avoid letting this relatively unusual paradigm harden into familiar polemics against literary theory. As the editors observe, discussing literature requires discussing a huge range of topics (language, psychology, history, and so on), so it should not be surprising “that literary studies have become a breeding ground for new ideas pertaining not merely to literature and literary meanings” (p. 14). In a similarly generous spirit, Torsten Pettersson says that recent criticism has “offered countless insights, often prompted by the introduction of new materials for study, and generally speaking opened up an unprecedented wealth of interpretative possibilities” (p. 157). Worries linger about the “amateurism” that can arise when literary scholars try to bridge gaps between academic specialties (p. 15), and Paisley Livingston concludes his essay by dismissing “implausible claims about the instrumental utility of literary-critical publications” (p. 109), by which he presumably means that critical articles on medieval poetry are unlikely to help many workers’ movements. But, on the whole, the collection is relatively free of the usual diatribes against postmodernism, deconstruction, the “politicization” of literary studies, and so on. Whether something else is lost in all this evenhandedness is a question to which I shall return.

The editors (though not the table of contents) note that the six essays break down into two parts. The first three “offer meta-reflections on literary studies,” its broadest connections to human significance and disciplinary status, and the final three papers suggest

“various ways forward,” exploring different models for future critical practice (p. 17).

Anders Pettersson’s “Literary Studies and Human Priorities” begins with a poem by Tomas Tranströmer in order to identify how literary works can occasion new “maps” of experience. Maps are typically associated with the kind of knowledge that is used for changing the material world instrumentally (knowledge “of technological importance” [p. 55]), whereas the maps provided by literary texts, he argues, are both larger and more indirect, allowing us to “possess a larger picture of the world and to have notions about how we are to live” (p. 38). And the same, he claims, holds for works of criticism, which in the best cases “make us see things in our lives afresh” (p. 56). His example is *The Madwoman in the Attic*, Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s classic 1979 study of nineteenth-century female writers, which helped sharpen not only our sense of certain writers, but also the “larger whole of which we ourselves form [a] part . . . thereby affording us a new view of our own situation” (p. 56). This is the task of all the humanities, which, though not divorced entirely from practical pursuits, is designed primarily to broaden “our understanding of the world around us, particularly our perspective on the human and social reality in which we exist” (p. 59).

Olsen’s “The Discipline of Literary Studies,” one of the volume’s strongest essays, sketches a history of the practices surrounding literary study, beginning with the Greek *paideia* and extending through the establishment of university programs in the nineteenth century. It is a history of two models: sometimes literary studies aids training in grammar and rhetoric, and sometimes it aids the study of morals, metaphysics, and government. But with the establishment of academic programs came a new demand for a “disciplinary matrix,” a set of concepts and conventions that license valid arguments and a group of practitioners who agree on them. Olsen rightly emphasizes that particular critical theories are never independent of larger socio-institutional shifts: the need (for example) in the early twentieth century for a clear “research object” encouraged ideas of “aesthetic autonomy.” The essay concludes with the claim that literary studies is justifiable if we modify our concept of a “discipline.” Instead of saying simply that universities “produce” knowledge, we should recall that they “advance” knowledge, examining crucial parts of our cultural history and helping to maintain and shape our cultural values. And instead of saying disciplines are “scientific,” we should conceive of literary studies as “disciplined intellectual work,” raising standards of argument and fostering an internally coherent set of intellectual practices.

Like Pettersson and Olsen, Livingston also distinguishes literary from technological and scientific

research. His “Beyond Literary Knowledge” retrieves C. I. Lewis to make two claims: that literary works give us a noninstrumental “final value” and that literary research “not only promotes, but makes possible and is necessary to that type of literary value” (p. 97). The first claim has a long history, but the second claim Livingston makes through Lewis’s less familiar account of the ontology of the work. An aesthetic object is never *only* a physical object (*Middlemarch* is not all the copies of *Middlemarch*), yet it is also not an “ideal” object, an abstract type or imperceptible thing, which would not elicit any *aesthetic* contemplative experience. It is instead (and here, Livingston notes, Lewis anticipates Kendall Walton, Jerrold Levinson, and others) to be “located in an associated context of the physically presented thing” (p. 103), a context that includes the history of prior artistic accomplishments and various semantic features such as allusion and reference. Works are available neither to the senses alone nor in the texts alone, so having an adequate grasp of them means having “the requisite conceptual background, beginning with basic notions pertaining to art-making and the categories of art, and moving on to specific information about the actual history of the making of the work” (p. 107). The job of literary studies is to furnish this context, which ultimately provides access to literature’s noninstrumental value.

Erik Bjerck Hagen, “The Heteronomy of Literary Value,” begins the second half of the book by announcing that literary studies exists for “the enhancement of literary experience in the culture,” and his sense of “experience” derives explicitly from pragmatism. In a nice turn of phrase, Hagen claims that a literary work is a “heteronomous event” rather than an “autonomous text,” and in a rebuttal to the New Critical emphasis on “unity” and “complexity,” he defends what he calls “originality,” “reality,” and “sincerity.” Why the New Critics need a rebuttal today is unclear, but Hagen’s brief, adventurous reading of *The Great Gatsby* suggests how his favored terms might enliven our literary discussions. Following Lionel Trilling, he notes the crucial importance of tone and mood in Fitzgerald’s book, and he then moves back and forth between the novel and various other literary and cultural contexts, including Joan Didion’s description of Dick Cheney and Norman Mailer’s account of the Kennedys. All this is done in order to show how texts might get into “explicit dialogue with the beliefs constituting our culture” (p. 132).

Bo Pettersson’s “An Invitation to Imagine: On the Significance of Imagination in Literature and Literary Studies,” is the only essay heavily indebted to cognitivist literary theory, and one’s response to it will depend on one’s sense of the cogency of these theories. Pettersson invokes them in order to show,

like Hagen, how literary studies could become more entwined with other aspects of our culture. Cognitivist theory, he claims, tends to focus too exclusively either on metaphor (Lakoff, Johnson) or on narrative (Damasio, Bruner), and in literary studies we see a similar split. Tying these strands together, however, would allow us to study “the multifaceted ways figures and narratives intertwine in different kinds of text,” a project that, he (ambitiously) claims, might put literary studies “in the forefront of research in the life and human sciences” (p. 153). Literary scholars, the essay implies, should continue to do more or less what they already do, setting particular imaginative works within the broader historical and cultural landscape, but reframing this work in specifically cognitivist terms would “give the discipline a new sense of mission and tie it to the study of humankind more intimately than before” (p. 155).

Torsten Pettersson concludes the volume with “The Case for Synergetic Criticism—The Example of *Othello*.” He, too, sketches a model for future practice, and begins by characterizing contemporary literary studies as a “cacophony,” in contrast to the “tonal polyphony” and “harmonious structure” that (very roughly speaking) marked literary studies before 1970. In contrast to both these options, Pettersson’s ideal is an “atonal polyphony” that would allow critical voices to remain “discordant,” but “connected with each other in a coordinated and meaningful way” (p. 169). “Synergetic criticism” would “relinquish the impossible ideal of the coherent and self-consistent master interpretation” (this ideal is simply impossible, he says [p. 159]) in favor of “a more complicated combination of elements that do not seem readily compatible” (p. 168). A. C. Bradley’s character analysis of *Othello*, for instance, need not be at odds with Edward Snow’s psychoanalytic reading of the play and character; each offers “partial insights,” and taken together, they “illuminate the complexity of Othello’s reactions better than either does on his own” (p. 179). Only by getting away from our “splintered methodologies,” only by working collaboratively to reconcile our readings, can we both defend the cognitive value of literary studies and also remain true to the work itself, which, he claims, exists “*simultaneously* in all contexts: in the biographical, career-related, literary, linguistic, social, political, archetypal etc. contexts” (p. 163).

Each of these essays includes astute observations about the state of contemporary literary studies and intelligent proposals about its future. And one can hardly object to the editors’ belief “in the possibilities of reasoned argument” or their hope for “mutual understanding and acceptance,” both within literary studies and between literary studies and the wider scholarly community (p. 28). By the end of the book, however, this basic tone of optimism and

reasonableness may to some readers begin to seem thin or one-dimensional. After all, one need not be Nietzsche to wonder if Aristotle was able to offer the first philosophical defense of poetry only by draining away some of its life. One may begin to wonder, that is, whether there is something about powerful literary works, particularly, though not at all exclusively, powerful modern works, that may *not* fit very comfortably within institutions devoted to modern canons of knowledge and rationality. Perhaps there are reasons why intelligent, serious, learned literary readers have been drawn less often to Davidson and C. I. Lewis than to (among other things) Freud's explorations of dreams and psychosis and violence, or Adorno's critique of "identity thinking," or Foucault's histories of madness and sexuality. One may object to what seems an apocalyptic note in these and similar writings; some of them may exaggerate claims about historical and cultural variation; and if they descend into dogmatism or mystification, they should be interrogated. But these projects might also be keenly attuned to a permanently unsettling or perplexing quality in literary works, a quality that may sometimes impel its audiences away from well-administered languages and into seemingly counterintuitive regions of thought. To adapt a phrase from Stanley Cavell (a figure notably absent in these pages), one feels by the end of *Why Literary Studies?* a wish to hear more of an acknowledgment of the "truth of skepticism": in this case, voices asking what might be lost, evaded, excluded, or diminished by our current institutional arrangements. It is certainly salutary to hear the "firm conviction" in these essays "that literary studies has an obvious role to play" (p. 27) among our disciplines. But the mood of confidence may also leave one wondering why other, less reassuring moods would ever have been entertained not just by deans and college presidents, not just by scientists and engineers, but most importantly by the poets themselves.

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SIMMONS, WALTER. *The Music of William Schuman, Vincent Persichetti, and Peter Mennin: Voices of Stone and Steel*. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2011, 436 pp., \$69.95 cloth.

Walter Simmons is a well-known scholar and music critic who writes for various publications, including *Fanfare* and *Musical America*. *Voices of Stone and Steel* is a sequel to Simmons's earlier work, *Voices in the Wilderness*, which discussed six American "neoromantic composers." Both books focus on "composers who created significant, artistically meaning-

ful bodies of work without abandoning traditional forms and procedures" (p. 7).

Both groups also rejected serialism, the mid-twentieth-century version of the twelve-tone system created by Arnold Schoenberg around 1920. Schoenberg thought the Austro-Germanic forms based on tonality had exhausted themselves and needed replacement with a new atonal system. The serialists embraced this concept with a vengeance, eventually taking over the "classical" musical establishment at Ivy League music departments and elsewhere and ostracizing composers who did not follow the serialist line. Nonserialist composers (including the trio in Simmons's book) were viewed as, to quote Simmons quoting Pierre Boulez, "irrelevant" and "USE-LESS." The fact that most people found serialist music unlistenable did not trouble the serialists, as exemplified by Milton Babbitt's notorious 1958 *High Fidelity* article, "Who Cares If You Listen?"

The antidote to overripe self-indulgent tonal music, however, need not be a new system banishing tonality. As Simmons points out, the serialists simply substituted one rigid Austro-Germanic system with another. He rejects both "the view that the fundamental significance of tonality is its function as a macrostructural organizing principle" (p. 5) and "the assumption that the evolution of the tonal system proceeded according to a linear progression that led inevitably to the dissolution of tonality altogether" (p. 6). Composers like William Schuman, Vincent Persichetti, and Peter Mennin could reject tonality as a fundamental structural principle while keeping tonality as an expressive parameter, along with melody, rhythm, and tone color, and they could do this while retaining traditional forms such as the sonata. The composers in Simmons's new book produced their major works between 1940 and the mid-1980s. All three were associated with the Julliard School: Schuman and Mennin as presidents and Persichetti (who was offered but declined the presidency) as a member of the faculty.

Schuman came to music in an interesting way. While he was enrolled in business school, his sister gave him a ticket to a New York Philharmonic concert. Schuman, who had never been to an orchestra concert before, was so bowled over that he immediately decided to become a composer, dropping out of business school the next day and enrolling in music classes. He was initially influenced heavily by Roy Harris, but arrived at his own style by the time he composed the work Simmons calls his masterpiece, *Symphony No. 6*. This is not Schuman's most popular symphony; that would be *Symphony No. 3*, followed by *No. 5* for strings. The debt to Harris may undercut the claims of the *Third Symphony*, though to my mind it is better than any symphony Harris ever wrote. But Simmons's advocacy certainly caused me to listen

repeatedly to the *Sixth*, and his judgment may easily be right. Other Schuman works praised by Simmons include the *Violin Concerto* and the ballet *Judith*.

Unlike Schuman, Persichetti was a child prodigy; he played piano on a radio broadcast at age six. Persichetti enjoyed a varied career as a performer, a popular teacher at conservatories, a music critic, an author of a treatise on harmony, and of course a composer. Although forming only a small part of his total output, Persichetti is best known for his compositions for wind band. However, he wrote music in many different forms and was an eclectic and resourceful composer. According to Simmons, his masterpiece is *Symphony No. 5* for strings, a work that is my own favorite among those I am familiar with.

Mennin followed the most conventional path, attending the Oberlin Conservatory, followed by the Eastman School. His *Symphony No. 3* was premiered by the New York Philharmonic at the time he received his doctorate from Eastman. A post at Juilliard led to the presidency (over Schuman's objections). Mennin composed relatively few works and is best known for his symphonies, the *Seventh* being an especially strong work.

A book such as this raises the question how does one write about music? The answer, in the case of Mr. Simmons, is quite well. He wisely eschews the use of musical examples, the bane of laypersons who are not reading the book at a piano, assuming they can play the piano. Nor is his writing bogged down in technical musical terminology, though some of that is unavoidable. A CD furnished with the book containing representative works by all three composers is helpful, but in truth is no substitute for a broader acquaintance with their works. Fortunately, the astonishing proliferation of "classical" music on CD (offering listening opportunities unimaginable when these composers were active) makes this acquaintance possible.

After very helpful introductory biographies of each composer, Simmons provides an in-depth discussion of their principal works. He recognizes that this may be tough going if you are not familiar with the music and recommends that you rather skip around and return to consult the book after hearing a work, as appropriate. Simmons also discusses early performances and recordings, but for me, the most fascinating parts of his treatment of individual works are his quotations from contemporary reviews and the reactions to the works as they were first performed, providing a real sense of how they were initially received. These reviews also produce nostalgia for a time when "classical" music had a more mainstream role in our culture, a role serialism did its best to obliterate.

A book such as this also inevitably raises the question of what constitutes "American music." (This

sometimes seems like a peculiarly American problem, though twentieth-century composers like Kodaly, Smetana, and Bartok looked to national music and themes in search of authenticity.) Some American composers have sought to answer this question by taking refuge in American content, folk music and jazz. Charles Ives's *Second Symphony*, Roy Harris's *Folk Song* and *Gettysburg* symphonies, and numerous works by Aaron Copland come to mind. That "American-ness" was not a major issue for Simmons's trio demonstrates a self-assurance that itself was perceived as an American trait at the time. Simmons quotes Aaron Copland saying of Schuman's compositions in 1971, "You have the feeling only an American could have written them. . . . You hear it in the kind of American optimism which is at the basis of his music" (p. 51). Simmons himself says, "Optimism, adventurousness, individualism, exuberance, brash vitality, emotional directness and innocence, syncopated or other irregular rhythmic patterns, and emphasis on winds and percussion relative to strings are just a few of the temperamental and musical traits held to be 'typically American'" (p. 9). How refreshing this sounds in contrast to recourse for "American-ness" to spirituals, jazz, or texts by Abe Lincoln.

In a century where the arts were obsessed with the "new," these composers showed little interest in originality for its own sake. Simmons quotes Schuman: "If you have to worry about originality or think about it, you're not original. And if you're a composer you are original in the sense that you're writing what you are, you're writing your personal profile, and if you don't have a personal profile, you're not a composer" (p. 52). As the quote demonstrates, what was important to Schuman was individuality, being true to himself.

A final question implicitly haunts the book: does music have to be enjoyable to be good? If the serialists thought of musical quality as a kind of indigestible medicine, Simmons certainly believes these three composers not only produced masterpieces, but also downright enjoyable music. A common reaction, says Simmons, of his students to first acquaintance with composers such as these is "How could music as appealing and rewarding as this be ignored for so long?" But of course, this is the reaction of music students. Most people, even people who like "classical music," will find listening to many of these works challenging. "Voices of Stone and Steel" is an appropriate title, but with careful attention, openness, and the repeated encounters made possible by CD, I believe the work of these composers should be much more popular than it is now.

At a time when these composers were all active, Stanley Cavell observed in a famous essay called "Music Discomposed" that "the task of the modern artist . . . is to find something he can be sincere and

serious in; something he can mean" ("Music Discomposed," in *Must We Mean What We Say?* [New York: Scribner, 1969], p. 212). Schuman, Persichetti, and Mennin succeeded admirably in this task. Simmons's book is a wonderful invitation to these composers and helps reclaim their reputations for a contemporary audience.

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RUPRECHT, LOUIS A., JR. *Winckelmann and the Vatican's First Profane Museum*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 252 pp., 28 b&w illus., \$85.00 cloth.

Ruprecht has a gift for telling stories that encapsulate his claims. For example, he reports that Pope Adrian VI (1522–1523) of Utrecht (the last non-Italian pope before John Paul II) was shown the private papal Belvedere gardens shortly after his ascension. Shocked by what he saw, he responded by saying, "Nothing but ancient idols" (p. 41). Before the establishment of museums, Greek statues were often displayed in gardens. Ruprecht underlines that the words of the pope suggest it was the paganism of the statues and not their nudity that shocked. Adrian promptly ordered the gardens closed and locked and held on to the key himself. According to some reports, he even had shutters made to cover the statues. Later, he proposed purging the Vatican by giving away 146 Greek pagan statues to the city of Rome, believing that such statues were inappropriate inside the Vatican.

As we know, the statues that we have come to see as priceless treasures, among them the Laocoön, the Apollo Belvedere, and the Belvedere Antinous, were not given away. After Adrian's short reign, Ruprecht explains, over the next century the Vatican would construct public museums and move the pagan statues from the gardens into newly constructed museums (some of which were literally constructed on top of the former gardens) in the very heart of the Vatican Palace. Ruprecht's central thesis is that another northern transplant, Winckelmann, would, with the help of the Italian Cardinal Alessandro Albani (1692–1779), play the principal role in arranging for the display of these statues in the Vatican and inviting the public to see them, and thereby create the first public art museum inside the Vatican. That today so many of us walk through the Vatican Museums without succumbing to Adrian's reaction is a testament to the success of Winckelmann and Albani's vision.

A second story tells of an afternoon in August 1765 when Winckelmann and Albani received an unexpected visit from Pope Clement XIII. Albani held the important position of Cardinal Librarian and was also an important collector of antiquities in his own right. Ruprecht argues that the pope came because Winckelmann and Albani had turned Albani's villa into a museum filled with classical art, hence a Profane Museum. Moreover, the same pair was in the process of doing the same thing for the pope in his Vatican Palace, and Clement wanted to get a sense of what his new Profane Museum would look like. Winckelmann was sitting downstairs reading, and so the pope saw him first. Startled (or perhaps pretending to be startled) by the unexpected visit, Winckelmann forgot to give the proper greeting. The pope reportedly asked what Winckelmann was reading, and before he could reply, Cardinal Albani shouted down from upstairs that it was undoubtedly not a sacred book, but rather a profane or perhaps even a heretical work. The pope was reportedly amused by the banter, and accepted Winckelmann's belated kiss of his slipper and went off to tour Albani's Profane Museum.

Ruprecht argues that Winckelmann's profane Vatican Museum successfully accomplished four great detachments. The Vatican Museums grew out of the Vatican Libraries, and thus the public museum was detached from the private library. This led to the textual being separated from the visual and a new importance being given to Greek statues. Third, the profane was detached from the sacred, and this led finally to Greek statuary art being detached from Greek religion. Winckelmann set up a museum in a space that was literally detached from the Vatican Library. That museum, in turn, taught us to see the statues that so shocked Adrian not as pagan religious objects, but rather as works of beautiful art. In that sense, even today when we see Greek devotional objects as art, we are under Winckelmann's sway. Winckelmann's Profane Museum prepared the way for Greek art to become sanctified as beautiful.

There has been a great deal of speculation about Winckelmann's sexuality recently, and Ruprecht addresses these questions. But the sexual questions that so occupy our contemporary imagination are, Ruprecht argues, less important and in some ways cloud our ability to see the greatness of Winckelmann's accomplishment. Ruprecht recounts the story that Casanova tells about finding Winckelmann engaged in sex with a young boy. Casanova apparently quickly excused himself, but Winckelmann later tracked him down to explain that he was not a pederast and thought pederasty was repulsive. At the same time, given his love for the Greeks who practiced pederasty, he felt the need to try it out.

Winckelmann further reports that though he had been trying it out for three or four years, he still did not enjoy it as much as he enjoyed relations with women. Winckelmann also added that it would be much more scandalous for him to have a mistress. On the other hand, Winckelmann apparently got in trouble for an offhanded anticlerical comment he made to Cardinal Albani. The remark caused a chill in their relationship that lasted several months. Religious issues were much more incendiary than sexual issues, and this makes Winckelmann's detachment of these Greek statues from their religious context all the more impressive and significant.

Ruprecht marvels not at Winckelmann's sexual life, nor the sexuality explicit in the nude statues, but at Winckelmann's ability to sanctify profane art. The Profane Museum becomes a gateway for the entire Vatican collection. No longer seeing these naked Greek statues as pagan idols, we now see them as encapsulating beauty. The Profane Museum led the visitor into the heart of the Vatican's *Cortile delle Statue* where the Apollo Belvedere and the Laocoön were displayed. Unlike the curiosity cabinets that preceded modern museums, these were not "roadside attractions" but rather "art historical treasures . . . well worthy of a pilgrimage all their own" (p. 96). Ruprecht writes about how Napoleon's looting of Rome was motivated by his viewing the art as "national treasures." Yet Ruprecht maintains that modern museums began earlier with Winckelmann's efforts at the Profane Museum. Winckelmann's museum does not suggest that we worship these Greek statues, but rather that we venerate the beauty we see in them. Winckelmann invites us to pause and linger over these statues and to admire their beauty. He also led us to believe that this Greek art and not the art of the Paleochristian era was "the true golden age of culture and refinement" (p. 130). In this sense, Ruprecht argues the Profane Museum triumphs over the sacred, and this triumph of Greek statues begins then in the very heart of the Vatican. Once Winckelmann elevates these statues to such importance, then it makes perfect sense that Napoleon wanted to take them.

Ruprecht's book is a labor of love as well as an immensely impressive scholarly undertaking. It began when he first heard about a Profane Museum that was located in the heart of the Vatican, and that led him to ask the rather obvious question, but a question that had not yet been addressed: why would the Vatican set up a Profane Museum and do it in the heart of the Vatican? The book is a product of research spanning eight years not only in the Vatican Library and in the Vatican Secret Archives, but also in several other libraries in Rome and in the French National Library. The book is relatively short, but it includes eight appendices that buttress his argu-

ment that Winckelmann was the key force behind the creation of the Profane Museum and that the Profane Museum was intended as the gateway for the entire Vatican Museums. For those interested in Winckelmann, Appendix 1 provides a complete list of his works. Other appendices display Ruprecht's careful search of the Vatican's archives in an attempt to understand the origins of the Vatican Museums. For example, in Appendix 3, Ruprecht provides a long excerpt (in Italian and in English translation as well) of Clement XIII's pronouncement that two museums (a Sacred Museum and a Profane Museum, although in this pronouncement it is not called the Profane Museum) will be created within the Vatican and then provides very helpful notes that explain how he interprets the pronouncement. In Appendix 4, he carefully documents how the Profane Museum received much greater funding than the Sacred Museum. Appendix 7 reproduces the list of artworks that the French took that was found in the Armistice of Bologna (1796; and reiterated in the Treaty of Tolentino 1797) and then compares that list to Roman records. In another helpful commentary, Ruprecht points out that the two lists offer striking support for his thesis. The French took only 15 paintings, and all of them portrayed Christian stories, but they took 85 statues, and all of them were pagan. This supports Ruprecht's claim that Winckelmann's Profane Museum so elevated the value of these statues that they were seen as particularly desirable loot.

One of the central mysteries behind the Profane Museum is the nature of Winckelmann's involvement with it. The more Ruprecht learned about and thought about the Profane Museum, the more he suspected Winckelmann was its chief architect, but it was only shortly before the completion of the manuscript that Ruprecht discovered in the Vatican's Secret Archives a receipt that paid Winckelmann for some of his work on the Profane Museum. That receipt is reproduced, translated, and then explained in Appendix 8.

It is rare to find a work that is both scholarly and poetic, but that is exactly what Ruprecht has given us. The writing is lush and beautiful. The last chapter, in particular, describes the current state of the Villa Albani that was, Ruprecht argues, Winckelmann's first Profane Museum, and it does so with great elegance and style. I would like to see (perhaps in a future work) a more detailed explanation of what can be found today in the room that housed Winckelmann's Profane Museum and Ruprecht's best estimate of what was originally there. I would also like to hear more about the Capitoline Museum that, as Ruprecht notes, preceded the Vatican Museums. Had some of what Ruprecht attributes to Winckelmann already been done before at the Capitoline? I would also like to see Ruprecht think some more about what this

story about Winckelmann can tell us about contemporary experiences of art. Can the case be made, for example, that our contemporary experience of art is in some sense a religious experience, and if so, what new insights might this bring to our understanding of art? Ruprecht has thought a great deal in his previous work about the boundaries between religion and other phenomena (*Was Greek Thought Religious: On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, From Rome to Romanticism* [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002]), and I would like to hear more about this in the future. In other words, like all great books, Ruprecht's work answers some questions by raising a host of new questions. My sense is that Ruprecht would not mind spending more time in Rome thinking about these and other questions.

Ruprecht has given us a tour de force that transforms the way we view art museums. In this, his seventh book, his considerable scholarly skills are constantly on display: to cite just two things, it is extraordinary to see his facility in French, German, Italian, and Ancient Greek as well as his extraordinary dedication to archival research. As Ruprecht constantly reminds us, it is difficult to understand origins. He calls his book a work of "palimpsestic historiography," arguing that the object of his study, the Profane Museum, did not stand still but was constantly "added in to, rearranged, torn down or looted, and then later rebuilt" (p. xvi). It is not easy to get back to the origin of Winckelmann's museum, but Ruprecht has shown that every time we enter a contemporary museum and view the experience as an opportunity to contemplate things of great spiritual importance, we are in a sense ushered into a world that Winckelmann to a large extent created.

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ALDRICH, VIRGIL CHARLES. *My Century*. Ed. Alan Mendelson. Raleigh, NC: Lulu.com, 2010, 295 pp., \$34.95 cloth.

ALDRICH, VIRGIL CHARLES. *Philosophical Reflections*. Ed. Alan Mendelson. Raleigh, NC: Lulu.com, 2010, ix + 136 pp., \$29.95 cloth.

As *JAAC* readers will know, Virgil Aldrich (1903–1998) was president of the American Society for Aesthetics and the author of *Philosophy of Art* (Prentice Hall, 1963), a widely used introduction to aesthetics. He taught at Rice, Kenyon College (I was one of his students), and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He held visiting appointments at Columbia (where he became friendly with G. E.

Moore in the 1940s) and at Brown. After retiring from Chapel Hill in 1972, he continued to teach and to do research at the University of Utah for virtually the rest of his life.

From the beginning of his career in the 1930s, Aldrich wrote on aesthetics, philosophy of language, philosophical psychology, metaphysics, and religion. His well-known 1943 essay "Pictorial Meaning and Picture Thinking" (reprinted in Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars's classic anthology, *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*) contributed to early analytic attempts to distinguish nonpositivist forms of linguistic meaning. In the 1950s and after, he continued his interest in philosophy of language, especially from the ordinary-language and Wittgensteinian perspectives. His long, intensive engagement with *Philosophical Investigations* (particularly with Part II, §xi, and its discussion of seeing-as) led him to an original metaphysical account of categorial ways of perceiving the world under different aspects (basic, simple perception, and, developing from this matrix, scientific observation and aesthetic prehension). This account is unlike anything produced by the many other philosophers who, although not students of Wittgenstein's, nevertheless came heavily under his influence, and to my mind it is much more interesting than a good deal of that material. It is briefly sketched in Aldrich's 1963 volume and developed in more detail in his 1958 American Philosophical Association presidential address ("Chess Not Without the Queen") and in many other essays. Late in life, he published *The Body of a Person* (University Press of America, 1988; completed in 1977), a reflective discussion of physicalism in philosophy of mind that builds on his ideas about categorial perception and on Wittgenstein's view that "the human body is the best picture of the human soul" (*Investigations*, Part II, §iv). Aldrich continued to work on these themes until his death.

The two volumes under review were found in the collection of his papers at Utah and were edited by Alan Mendelson of McMaster University, one of his Kenyon students. (I and others urged Mendelson to proceed, but otherwise I played no part in their publication.) The texts reflect Aldrich's ongoing engagement with categorial perception, and they illustrate his idiosyncratic ability to provide deft, imaginative suggestions about central philosophical issues, both inside and outside aesthetics. They are also deeply personal works that discuss a wide variety of topics: his cultural views (for example, his very mid-twentieth-century concerns about technology and automation), his sense of his life in philosophy and of how the subject has developed, and diverse other matters ranging from hunting and nuclear warfare to the phenomenology of automobile driving. Brought up in India by missionary parents, Aldrich, in the course of his lifelong devotion to

philosophy, also painted, hunted, wrote short stories, appreciated scotch, and loved the expressive sport of driving. He was a kind gentleman of the old school in his demeanor. Yet, although his general outlook was light years away from that of the mid-century Beats, he had an outsider's perspective and the loneliness of someone who sees through, even if he does not necessarily reject, conventional social situations, and this point of view comes through in the present volumes. It is interesting to compare works like Jack Kerouac's *On the Road* and Gary Snyder's poem "Night Highway 99" with Aldrich's sober yet sometimes quietly ecstatic comments on highway driving, for example in *My Century*, pp. 17ff., 82–85, 186–187, and at the beginning of *Philosophical Reflections*. At least from Whitman on, the open road has been a characteristic metaphor in American life, and Aldrich participated in his own way in its rebirth in the 1950s.

Philosophic Reflections (so-titled by Mendelson; the original was simply labeled by Aldrich "N.B. II"; "N.B. I" has not been found) is a collection of journal entries on mainly philosophical topics. It was begun in 1963, but all but the first few entries are undated. They sketch ideas that Aldrich worked out elsewhere (for example, entry #295, pp. 113–114, presents the view, developed in *The Body of a Person* and in earlier essays, that our perception of a person resembles our perception of a picture). However, the entries also contain many thoughts that Aldrich, as far as I know, did not develop further. The book is an intellectual diary, and I doubt that Aldrich planned to publish it. He seems to have quarried it for ideas that he published later, and some of them appear also in *My Century*.

My Century is a very different sort of work, which Aldrich may at some points have thought of making public. It is undated but seems roughly contemporaneous with *Philosophical Reflections*. (Aldrich finally copyrighted it in 1987, shortly before he published *The Body of a Person*.) Following the strategy of philosophical suggestion, in *My Century* Aldrich sets out, "in a style of writing that is full of immediacy, to convey the quality of my philosophical experience" (p. 10). He attempts to "salvage" his own impressions of the twentieth century (see also *Reflections*, p. 14), and he considers not just the questions about hunting, technology, and automation mentioned earlier but all manner of other things, from imagination and pictorial meaning, the possibility of machine thought, and the distinction between games and sports to the nature of moral conduct and the Kantian emphasis on treating people as persons and not as things. (Aldrich suggests at pp. 68–74 that in many situations we would better achieve our ethical and other goals if we treated human beings as things, tools to be used with love and understanding when they work well but gently set aside if they begin to fail us seriously.)

Throughout, Aldrich allies himself with the ideas of descriptive metaphysics and "linguistic phenomenology," as such ideas were introduced in the 1960s by thinkers like P. F. Strawson and J. L. Austin. (He also expresses appreciation, in various texts, for Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception.) He returns repeatedly to his views about categorial aspect and the different ways in which objects appear to us perceptually and within theoretical frameworks. The text is unfinished (he incorporated some of his published essays without fully integrating them into the discussion, for example); and, as he wrote, he seems to have had a rueful awareness of how unusual a volume he was producing. He says fairly early in *Philosophical Reflections* (#175), for instance, that "[s]ome books are for nobody—those that contain both professionally precise or accomplished passages, on the one hand, and relaxed, or impressionistic passages on the other for the general reader. . . . I am at present writing such a book—for nobody. It will probably be called *My Century*, which is the 20th" (#175, p. 42).

Aldrich did not, in the end, publish this book or, as far as I know, try to do so. Like *Philosophical Reflections* (and at the same intellectual level), but with a guiding theme and general structure, it remains a potpourri of interesting, often very original ideas. Some of the material has receded into history (Aldrich's comments on operationalism, for example, and on the leading ethical theories of the early 1960s), and anyone seeking information about his most fundamental views might well turn to the present volumes only after reading essays like "Chess Not Without the Queen," "Art and the Human Form" (*The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1971), "Pictures and Persons—An Analogy" (*Review of Metaphysics*, 1975), and *The Body of a Person*. In any case, and however one approaches them, I think that the ideas about categorial aspect perception and persons that *My Century* and *Philosophical Reflections* support and that Aldrich strove during the last third of his life to elucidate are still of considerable philosophical interest.

In these volumes and in his other works, Aldrich presents the general, metaphysical view that, roughly, we begin with a primary space of ordinary perception, a "field of experience" within which we identify objects like tables and stars and take action with them in view. If we then begin to investigate these objects in, say, physics, we in effect shift to a physical field (showing the objects under a different aspect, as the duck-rabbit picture is seen under its duck construal). These objects appear anew in this field but are now taken as determined in themselves in their physical nature. If, again, we begin to perceive the objects aesthetically, we apprehend them under aesthetic controls in a way that generates a different field in which they

now appear determined as aesthetic objects. Truths and laws about the objects hold relative to the fields and objects under consideration; thus, causal and reductive claims about the human brain and body may hold with respect to objects considered as physical things, but they do not hold these objects as they are presented in primary perception.

When he extends such ideas to picture- and person-perception, Aldrich suggests that we treat a representational painting both as a purely physical complex of pigments and canvas and also, by a shift in perception, as bodying forth (or presenting to us), so as to be seen "in" it, the objects that it represents; these objects (if they exist physically at all) will not have exactly the same qualities as the objects that are present in the physical world to which the painting belongs as a physical thing. Similarly, he suggests, our recognition of the person who is connected with a certain human body B is a recognition neither of some dualistic, nonphysical entity nor of some higher-level physical thing whose mental processes are to be reduced to physical, molecular goings-on at the brain level. (Nor is it a recognition of an apparent entity that in the end is to be eliminated altogether from our physical picture of the world.) Rather, body B functions, in our perception, as "a living, natural picturing device" (*The Body of a Person*, p. 57; cf. *Reflections*, #295, pp. 113–114). The physical patterns and movements of B body forth (display in animated fashion as to be seen "in" themselves) the *person*, with all her thoughts, worries, joys, and expressive gestures.

A person is thus roughly analogous to an object seen in a picture (or to the physical parts of a sculpture seen as themselves *being* expressively charged gestures, not simply as being physical struts and protuberances). There is no sense to the idea of reducing van Gogh's sunflowers to the pigments on the canvas, and those sunflowers have their own true characterization at the aesthetic level, a characterization that cannot be translated into or reduced to any characterization of the picture at the physical level. Similarly, Aldrich will hold, there is no sense to reducing the person Jeanne d'Arc (with all her thoughts and feelings) to physical processes in her brain and body. Nor could she (as could a dualist mind) have had a different, quite distinct body; nor could her body have diverged much from its standard human form (upright, a single head atop two arms and two legs). And our characterizations of Jeanne d'Arc, the person, in life and action (going into battle in order to defend the Dauphin, and so on) cannot be translated into or reduced to characterizations of what went on in her brain or nervous system. These ideas give a sense of Aldrich's highly original gloss on Wittgenstein's view that the human body depicts the human soul and that, for example, "a smiling mouth *smiles* only in a human face" (*Investigations*, Part I, §583).

Aldrich stated the above ideas in more detail than I have done (and I have ignored various points and also possible differences between earlier and later versions of his position). However, he never succeeded in stating his views in a fully systematic, worked-out way. His grand metaphysical picture leaves many questions open. Why are just these aspects available to us? What individuates an aspect? Do we all perceive under the same aspects, and what makes our aspect perception public and objective? What is the exact ontological relation of the objects that appear to us in physical or aesthetic perception to the objects in the initial, matrix field of experience? Identity? Some kind of supervenience? And what is the ontological status of these appearing objects themselves? (Do the different fields amount to different yet equally objective phenomenal worlds, in some updated Kantian fashion, for example?) Again, to what extent is Aldrich's view of aesthetic perception undermined by George Dickie's and others' critiques of the notion of aesthetic experience? Or, again, many points about Aldrich's view of persons need further discussion. For instance, if a person is simply what appears "in" or through the human body in the way that the sunflower appears "in" the painting, then in what sense does that person act causally in the world? (After all, the sunflower "in" the picture does not reflect light into the eyes of its viewers; and the picture itself, unlike the embodied person, is not a thinking, feeling, self-aware subject.)

To the extent that Aldrich leaves such questions unanswered, his views are incomplete. Conceivably, these views cannot be satisfactorily completed, if (as I think has certainly not been shown) they are irremediably defective, through and through. However, whatever the fates of various of their details, I think that Aldrich's core ideas remain of great interest, and it may be possible to defend parts of them even if one rejects other parts. At a very general level, his views have helped to stimulate my own (non-Wittgensteinian) approaches to Kant and to fictional objects, but I have never tried to argue for them in their own terms. To do so in a careful, detailed way would require not only philosophical talent, but also independence of mind and hard work. One cannot simply pick up new thoughts from Aldrich's texts and transplant them, fully formed, into other areas of philosophy in the way that, sometimes with remarkable results, the immediate successors of major figures such as Saul Kripke and Willard Van Orman Quine have raided their works for fruitful ideas that can be applied elsewhere.

While fully accepting (and praising) the analytic standards that Moore and others brought to his century of philosophy, Aldrich himself lamented his inability to give a systematic and precise conceptual formulation of his ideas (see, for example, *My Century*,

p. 7). I think that even in the essays and passages in his books where he works things out in comparative detail, his strength lies in his power of suggestion rather than in his ability to provide comprehensive, finely tuned analytic structures. Nevertheless, we should remember that the value of much excellent philosophy, beginning with the pre-Socratics, has lain in its powers of suggestion, and many of Aldrich's suggestions go deep.

Thus, even if we do not accept Aldrich's overall aspect metaphysics, we have not by any means exhausted the interest of the general idea that we, as embodied cognitive subjects, somehow constitute a world of objects (or various worlds of objects, depending on our goals and interests) as we interact perceptually with the world "in itself" around us. These objects are then the things that we take ourselves to confront in our ordinary doings, things that reflect, but that also differ from objects in their physical natures in themselves. Such ideas, with their ultimately Kantian roots, may turn out to be a dead end. But they also may not, and Aldrich's suggestive approach to them seems as good a place to start as any. (For example, in my view his approach offers as interesting a take-off point as does Sellars's still-not-exhausted distinction between the manifest and the scientific images of the world.)

Similarly, and while I think that by the late 1960s critics had undermined the Wittgenstein-inspired view that there is a "criterial" connection between bodily behavior and the mental states that that behavior expresses, I do not believe that anyone has worked out all the implications of Aldrich-inspired ideas for an account of our knowledge of other people and of their mental states. For example, it may be that we, as biologically evolved, embodied creatures, spontaneously and without conscious reflection experience physical gestures and features of the human body, in an aspect-like fashion, as directly animated by, even as suffused with, mental states such as happiness, sadness, attention, and pleasure. No inference to the presence of such states or argument to the best explanation is involved in this experience. (And then, to sketch a further, Aldrich-inspired idea that is relevant to a long-disputed topic in aesthetics, this experience may get spontaneously extended to inanimate objects such as works of art and to our grasp, in perception, of the expressive qualities of those works.)

The present trend in philosophy and in much of aesthetics focuses on finely articulated, fiercely argued systematic thought. Many readers of this review will surely subscribe wholeheartedly to this trend, as I do myself. Its intense analytic attention to philosophical fundamentals has brought us many intellectual benefits. We should not now abandon the progress that we have made. But I suspect that Aldrich's suggestions contain undiscovered truths, and I would

encourage anyone who finds these suggestions tantalizing to pursue them further. In his quiet, reflective way, Aldrich was a remarkably stimulating thinker, someone who had the power to throw light on almost any topic that he touched. Reading the two present, posthumous volumes, even in their unfinished state, may help us to profit from his ideas and to appreciate that fact.

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FREEMAN, DAMIEN. *Art's Emotions: Ethics, Expression and Aesthetic Experience*. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012, xii + 210 pp., \$27.95 paper.

An unending series of philosophers since Plato has been concerned to analyze and explain relations between art, the emotions, and moral awareness. Recently, however, the volume of first-rate work on this theme has dramatically increased. Just to mention a few, Mette Hjort and Sue Laver's landmark collection of papers, *Emotions and the Arts*, appeared in 1997; Derek Matravers's *Art and Emotion* in 1998; Martha Nussbaum's *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* in 2001; Jenefer Robinson's *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music and Art* in 2005; Berys Gaut's *Emotion and Ethics* in 2007; and, in 2012, this new, ambitious, and richly rewarding book by Damien Freeman. There is a profoundly serious rationale behind all these studies, one that relies on the cross-fertilization of subdisciplines, but only as a means to establishing important, underappreciated truths about art and our experience of it. They focus on ways we invest emotionally in artworks, derive emotional benefits from them, and incorporate these emotional ingredients into aesthetic experiences that can have a significant bearing on the leading of a rewarding life. Freeman is not alone in claiming that cultivating the kind of aesthetic experience that certain artworks afford us conduces to powerful moral consequences.

What is distinctive about Freeman's approach, and what makes his book a particularly valuable addition to the recent string of works on art and emotion, is his argument that our encounter with artworks, or at least certain of them, affords a peculiar kind of syncretic appreciation he calls "the plenary experience of emotion," an experience that draws upon our entire emotional economy and links it (or holds the potential for linking it) to a life of interpersonal engagement as opposed to moral desolation. Freeman claims that the plenary experience of emotion is attainable *only* in our experience of art, and, while

this is by no means a sufficient condition of human flourishing, it can contribute mightily to it. The basis for this claim is laid in a lengthy, carefully developed analysis of the nature of emotion, differences between the experience of our own emotions and the emotions of others, the interaction of emotions perceived and the emotions of the perceiver, and various projective properties of the experience of emotions as rendered in art. In the main, Freeman's theory tracks Richard Wollheim's. A heady blend of psychology and philosophy, it combines phenomenological evidence about the experience of emotion with (an admittedly less fully developed) conceptual analysis of its ingredient elements. Like Wollheim's, Freeman's account distinguishes between externalized properties, the traces we see in others of what we take to be their emotions (for example, a clenched fist seen as reflecting a person's anger), and projective properties, features of the world observed that bring us to be aware of emotive conditions and preconditions in ourselves (for example, a savannah as revealing associations of safety and bounty we find welling up from our unconsciousness). Freeman presents a detailed, cogent account of the various elements involved in both kinds of experience and of the various ways in which what we feel in response to the emotions we perceive engages our feelings, imagination, intellect, and self-awareness. In the course of developing his account of these themes, Freeman makes clear where and how he deviates from Wollheimian orthodoxy, as when he widens the central notion of emotion to make it a relation *between* mental dispositions and states, rather than one or the other, a move that opens up the prospect of the experiencing emotion in as a distinctive, tripartite relation.

To begin with, Freeman argues, it is important to regard art as concerned with not just particular emotions (fear, for example), but with the entire emotional economy, that is, with both the active and the passive elements in the process of our responses to the world, recognizing that emotion is both a state of response and a mental disposition that gives rise to that response. When, in general, we respond to emotion as experienced in the world, our emotions may relate to the perceived emotions in one of three ways: (1) the latter may *infect* the former, as when a baby's cries arouse a crying response in a formerly happy baby in the next pram; (2) the former may be an emotion different from the latter when the perceiver undertakes to deploy the new emotion in *communicating* with another, as when the mother responds to the crying baby with exasperation; and (3) the experience of the latter may lead us to reflect on feelings and experiences we previously had, drawing them into a comprehensible whole by *articulation*. The last of these is something like what happens

when the mother comes to regard the whole emotive episode as revealing something about cycles of comfort, discomfort, and consolation rooted in her own past and in her response to the welter of life's contingencies. Freeman acknowledges that philosophers have long recognized that these three ways of experiencing emotion can, in their application to various aesthetic objects, coalesce in such a way as to make it seem that there is one thing, rather than three things, going on. Aristotle, it seems, realized something like this connection, and put it to work in the notion of *catharsis*. But, what prior philosophers have not appreciated, Freeman says, is that, under the special circumstances of our engagement with art, the reactive triad may, in the distinctive plenary experience, generate a surplus intensity exceeding the cumulative intensities of its components.

Freeman's account of the fusion of emotive elements in the plenary experience of art lays the foundation of a powerful case for the priority of aesthetic experience in relation to other valuable social experiences. This is because, on this account, our intelligent, fully responsive engagement with artworks, or at least certain of them, presents the prospect of extending the perception of emotions in a special way. As Freeman points out, our experience of nonpsychological objects (for example, waves and caves) allows us to perceive projective properties, but not externalized properties, and our experience of psychological objects (for example, other agents) allows us to perceive externalized properties, but not projective properties. But, artworks, as nonpsychological objects created by psychological agents, can stimulate the audience's capacities to perceive both kinds of properties in them, and thus to enjoy a composite experience of a unique kind, one that permits individuals to come to terms with the relation between emotions as perceived in the world (including the emotions of others and those features of the world that seem to fit certain emotions) and the emotions that are peculiar to their own developmental history.

Among the book's many strengths is its deployment of artistic examples to clarify details of what might otherwise seem a dauntingly abstract analysis of emotions and their interrelations. J. M. W. Turner's *Fingal's Cave*, the first movement of Edward Elgar's *Cello Concerto*, and Shih-t'ao's *Returning Home* (a book of calligraphy and paintings) are given particularly illuminating interpretation. In discussing the Turner painting (which, conveniently, is reproduced on the book's cover), Freeman proposes that the painter was not so much interested in portraying the geographic landmark named in the work's title as he was in giving expression to an experience he had relating to both the scene depicted and the emotions elicited by the violent action of waves at sea and

in the cave's (scarcely hinted at) interior. There is, as Turner himself observed, a profoundly *indistinct* quality to the atmosphere conveyed in this work, a quality evocative of mystery, danger, uncertainty, violence, and perhaps more. The coalescing of these elements in the medium of paint on canvas incorporates infection, communication, and articulation as the artist works through both externalized properties in the scene and properties projected out of his own projective awareness of what emotions suit the elements in the scene. There is, in all of this, Freeman says, a sense of exploration and eventual discovery at work. The painting process is itself a working out of the ways in which a range of responses in the artist, colored by the events of his past emotional life, make one painterly rendition, rather than a host of others, appropriate and justified. This sense of emotional exploration and discovery extends to the viewer as well. Working through a range of responses to the painting, the viewer lets the work "reveal" itself to her, succeeding when she finds in it that congeries of artistic elements that allow her to appreciate the aptness of the analogy between this composition and a perceived emotional attitude as ways of framing emotional experience.

Kant famously declared that in judging that something is beautiful we are at the same time imputing a distinctively human beauty response to anyone else who is able to perceive it aright. His point (as always) was that in aesthetic judgment as in moral judgment (and, for that matter, everything else), *we are in this together*. We want to share in the experiences that count. It seems to me that Freeman is working the other side of the same fence. He is saying (to put it simplistically) that we should cherish art for the reason that it reveals a world in which we can be at home by establishing consanguinity between the emotional economy that, though it is mine alone, has resonance with yours as well, so that both of us can find in a given artwork an aesthetic experience that makes a contribution to the goodness of a good life by making us feel at home in a world we share.

These summary remarks can no more than hint at the analytical acuity and phenomenological plausibility of the book's account of the role of emotions in our engagement with art. Freeman has given us an ingenious, sophisticated theory that will become a benchmark for serious study in this field. The book is, however, not without its flaws. For one thing, having originated in a doctoral dissertation, it retains some of the faults so common to works of that kind: a certain amount of superfluous scholarly road-mapping, an excess of dutiful acknowledgment of earlier scholars, and a blindness to contemporary works making points similar to one's own. Then there is the matter of Wollheim's lurking presence. Although the book is largely quite original, it takes such pains de-

tailoring where it is and is not faithful to Wollheim's lead that it leaves itself too little time to locate its ideas effectively in the debate context of other recent work.

Although Freeman's argument is, on the whole, lucid and handsomely presented, there are a few points at which it remains unclear or underdeveloped. First, although Freeman frequently insists that it is *only* through art that the possibility of plenary experience arises, it is not clear why this should be so. It seems that all of the emotive elements he regards as proper to the experience of artworks might also be elements of other deeply interpretable, emotion-fraught human communications: love letters, say. Second, Freeman's insistence that the emotion-rich aesthetic experience of art inevitably involves engagement with the whole emotional economy is a reach in need of justification. Why should it not sometimes involve only a small part of this economy, just one corner of externalized emotional response: simple sorrow in response to a portrait of a sorrowful face, say. Third, Freeman's claim that the upshot of appropriate appreciation of (certain) artworks is truly an *ethical* outcome requires more defense than he gives it. As he observes, Roger Scruton has claimed that certain kinds of aesthetic experiences warrant judgments that our human powers and their prospects are in conformity; Kant thought so too. But, why should those judgments of such conformity be thought of as entailing normative conclusions? The case needs spelling out. And finally, there is the problem of connecting the aesthetic experiences of artist and audience in a way that truly cancels out the prospect of isolation and loneliness. On Freeman's account, the artist's coming to acquaintance with emotions experienced in the work setting is stamped with a distinctness born of the artist's personal history. This indelible connection to individual consciousness renders problematic the prospect of an aesthetic experience in which the audience can fully join. To suggest that artist and viewer have, in relation to a given work, something very much like the *same* emotion is to move in a direction of Tolstoyan romanticism Freeman explicitly rejects. But, to move in the opposite direction, conceding that important elements of the experiences the parties have are inextricable from their discrete personal histories, leaves us with a world in which, however much the parties feel at home, they are at home in different rooms.

The critical observations I have made should be understood as suggestions for amplification and elaboration, rather than radical reform. This is a book anyone interested in aesthetic experience in general or in the role of arts in relation to emotions should read. It is clearheaded, well informed, methodical, and handsomely argued. It addresses issues

everyone, and not just philosophers, should be concerned with: the role of art in society, the role of aesthetic experience in relation to other valued activities, the role emotions play in the world of arts, and reasons for thinking that emotions as presented in the arts play a peculiarly important role in relation to human flourishing. *Art's Emotions* deserves to be

recognized as one of the most important books in a field of burgeoning philosophical interest.

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